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I. SUMMARY
IN Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-dressed whether it would recognize “Honduran women unable toleave their relationship” as “a particular social group” warranting
asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).1 Relying on a
controversial administrative opinion by then-Attorney General Sessions
rather than addressing the individualized facts of the case, the court de-
nied asylum for failure to state a cognizable particular social group.2 The
Fifth Circuit incorrectly held that the proffered social group was not cog-
nizable, creating a blanket preclusion for groups seeking asylum based on
domestic abuse that overturns years of immigration law precedent and
runs contrary to the legislative intent expressed in the INA.
II. BACKGROUND
In April 2015, Maria Suyapa Gonzales-Veliz, a native and citizen of
Honduras, entered the United States and was apprehended at the bor-
der.3 When the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove her,
Gonzales-Veliz expressed her fear of returning to Honduras due to wide-
spread gang violence and abuse at the hands of her ex-boyfriend, who she
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2021; B.A., Human Biology & Cin-
ematic Arts, University of Southern California, 2018. Thank you to my family—Mom,
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1. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 231–32 (5th Cir. 2019).
2. Id. at 232.
3. Id. at 223.
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had attempted to sue for failure to pay child support.4 According to Gon-
zales-Veliz, the abuse was a direct result of the culture of machismo5 and
family violence in Honduras and the failure of Honduran police to pro-
tect her despite notifying them of the harm.6 On one occasion of abuse,
Gonzales-Veliz’s ex-boyfriend came to her house threatening her with a
gun.7 The police came to stop the harassment but later returned the gun
to her ex-boyfriend and notified Gonzales-Veliz that they could no longer
help her due to lack of personnel and resources.8
As a result of Gonzales-Veliz’s statements regarding the abuse, an asy-
lum officer referred the matter to an immigration judge for adjudication
of her claim.9 The immigration judge denied Gonzales-Veliz’s application
for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture pro-
tection on the grounds that she “failed to demonstrate that she was
harmed on account of a membership in a particular social group—Hon-
duran women unable to leave their relationship”—and that she failed “to
demonstrate that the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to
protect her.”10 Alternatively, the immigration judge denied relief for lack
of credibility and under the reentry bar for asylum, due to the fact that it
was her second unlawful entry to the United States.11 After the entry of
judgment, Gonzales-Veliz appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA).12
The BIA held in accordance with the immigration judge, finding that
even if Gonzales-Veliz was credible, her testimony failed to bear its bur-
den of proving that she belonged to the particular social group of Hondu-
ran women unable to leave their relationship or that the Honduran police
demonstrated an inability to protect her.13 Gonzales-Veliz then filed a
petition for review in the Fifth Circuit and a motion for reconsideration
before the BIA.14 However, while her motion was pending, then-Attor-
ney General Sessions issued a precedential administrative opinion15 in
4. Id. at 223, 225.
5. Machismo, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
machismo [https://perma.cc/DK7Q-NPJH] (defining “machismo” as “a strong sense of
masculine pride” and “an exaggerated masculinity”); see also Sonia Nazario, Someone Is
Always Trying to Kill You, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2019/04/05/opinion/honduras-women-murders.html [https://perma.cc/G6R7-YWFS]
(detailing the effects of machismo culture on Honduran women).
6. Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 225.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 223; see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., BASIC PROCEDURAL MAN-
UAL FOR ASYLUM REPRESENTATION AFFIRMATIVELY AND IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 39-
55 (Oct. 2017), available at https://www.unhcr.org/5aa6cfac4.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX4K-
LAYW] (detailing the defensive asylum process from arrest to appeal).




14. Id. at 224.
15. Precedent Decisions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis
.gov/legal-resources/precedent-decisions [https://perma.cc/KTK7-C43J] (“An Administra-
tive Appeals Office (AAO) decision may be designated as a ‘precedent decision’ by the
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Matter of A-B-, which held that “married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship” did not constitute a particular social
group meriting asylum, thereafter precluding any likelihood of success for
immigrants seeking asylum on the grounds of “private violence.”16 Ac-
cordingly, Gonzales-Veliz’s motion for reconsideration was denied.17
Upon review, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s denial of Gonzales-
Veliz’s application.18 Despite the fact that the Attorney General’s deci-
sion had recently been enjoined and vacated in part by a federal district
court in the District of Columbia, the Fifth Circuit relied on Matter of A-
B- in holding that Honduran women unable to leave their relationship
“cannot constitute a particular social group” for purposes of asylum.19
Specifically, the proffered social group was not cognizable because it
“does not exist independently of . . . the harm” and “lacks particular-
ity.”20 Characterizing asylum claims based on domestic abuse as claims of
“private violence,” the court noted that such “groups defined by their
vulnerability to private criminal activity likely lack the particularity” re-
quired for asylum.21
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Under the INA, the three essential elements for establishing an asylum
claim are: (1) membership in “a cognizable particular social group”; (2)
“a nexus between the harm and membership in the particular social
group”; and (3) an inability or unwillingness of the immigrant’s home-
country government to protect the asylum seeker.22 Prior to the decision
in Matter of A-B-, the BIA clarified in multiple precedential opinions that
a particular social group must be “(1) composed of members who share a
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3)
socially distinct within the society in question.”23 Relying on this prece-
dent, the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G- granted asylum to a victim of do-
mestic abuse based on the particular social group of “married women in
joint approval of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Board
of Immigration Appeals, and the Attorney General. Precedent decisions are legally bind-
ing on the DHS components responsible for enforcing immigration laws in all proceedings
involving the same issues. In addition, absent any controlling judicial precedent to the con-
trary, federal courts give greater deference to AAO precedent decisions, as well as to non-
precedent and adopted decisions that follow the same legal reasoning of a precedent
decision.”).
16. Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 224; Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319 (A.G.
2018).
17. Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 224.
18. Id. at 236.
19. Id. at 232.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 231–32 (emphasis added) (quoting A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335).
22. Id. at 228–29.
23. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392 (B.I.A. 2014); see also Cece v.
Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 677 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that young Albanian women who live
alone constitute a particular social group); Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667–69 (9th
Cir. 2010) (finding that “all women in Guatemala” may constitute a particular social group
due to a high risk of femicide).
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Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”24 In that case, the
BIA found that gender, or in the alternative, marital status, may consti-
tute a common immutable characteristic.25 In addition, the proffered so-
cial group was defined with enough particularity and was socially distinct
within the society due to unrebutted evidence of machismo and family
violence in Guatemalan culture.26
With Matter of A-R-C-G- as binding precedent,27 immigration judges in
subsequent asylum proceedings continued to recognize similar social
groups of married women and extended the protection to unmarried wo-
men as well.28 That is, until then-Attorney General Sessions’ decision in
Matter of A-B-, which overruled Matter of A-R-C-G- and effectively
barred claims for asylum based on domestic violence.29 In Matter of A-B-,
the Attorney General rejected “El Salvadoran women who are unable to
leave their domestic relationships where they have children in common”
as a particular social group because defining a group solely by the perse-
cution of its members “moots the need to establish actual persecution.”30
Rejecting the so-called circular reasoning of the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-
G-, the Attorney General stressed that the victim’s inability to leave was
created by the harm rather than existing independently of it.31 In addi-
tion, the social group lacked the requisite particularity “given that broad
swaths of society may be susceptible to victimization” and lacked social
distinction due to the highly individualized, rather than categorical, na-
ture of domestic abuse.32
The Matter of A-B- decision drew quick criticism and was recently
overruled in part by a federal district court case in the District of Colum-
bia.33 In Grace v. Whitaker, the district court held that all but two of the
policies set forth in Matter of A-B- were arbitrary and capricious and vio-
lated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the INA.34 With re-
gard to the particular social group analysis, the court held that Matter of
A-B- created a “general rule that effectively bars the claims based on
24. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 388.
25. Id. at 392–93.
26. Id. at 393–94.
27. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/33LH-YF2J] (last updated Oct. 15,
2008) (“BIA decisions are binding on all DHS officers and immigration judges unless mod-
ified or overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court.”).
28. See Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of A-R-C-G-: Evolving
Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2016) (citing CGRS
Database Case No. 10796 (Immigration J. Dec. May 19, 2015); CGRS Database Case No.
11333 (Immigration J. Dec. Apr. 24, 2015); CGRS Database Case, No. 9730 (Immigration
J. Dec. Apr. 2, 2015); CGRS Database Case No. 11302 (Immigration J. Dec. Jan. 20, 2015);
CGRS Database Case No. 10283 (Immigration J. Dec. Jan. 15, 2015)).
29. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (A.G. 2018); see Precedent Decisions,
supra note 15.
30. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 326, 335.
31. Id. at 334-45.
32. Id. at 335-36.
33. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 106 (D.D.C. 2018).
34. Id. at 146.
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certain categories of persecutors (i.e. domestic abusers or gang mem-
bers).”35 In doing so, the new rule violated existing immigration laws by
creating “an effective categorical ban” rather than conducting an individ-
ualized, case-specific analysis, as is required by the INA.36 As a result, the
district court in Grace v. Whitaker overruled the particular social group
analysis in Matter of A-B- and enjoined courts from applying the Attor-
ney General’s analysis in future cases.37
Disregarding the district court’s injunction, which is currently on ap-
peal,38 the Fifth Circuit relied on the particular social group rule set forth
in Matter of A-B- to deny Gonzales-Veliz’s application for asylum based
on domestic violence.39 The court first noted that Matter of A-B- “did not
create a categorical ban against groups based on domestic violence” and
that the BIA did not interpret the decision as such in Gonzales-Veliz’s
case.40 Rather, the court viewed Gonzales-Veliz’s proffered social group
as “substantially similar” to the group that was denied protection in Mat-
ter of A-B-.41 Citing Matter of A-B-, the Fifth Circuit found that “Hondu-
ran women unable to leave their relationship [was] impermissibly defined
in a circular manner.”42 Rather than existing independently of the harm,
the group was defined by it.43 Additionally, Gonzales-Veliz’s social group
“lack[ed] particularity because ‘broad swaths of society may be suscepti-
ble to victimization.’”44 Finally, with regard to the social distinction ele-
ment of the particular social group, the court held that Gonzales-Veliz’s
claims of machismo culture “provide[d] no guidance or aid in discerning
whether or how Honduran culture ‘perceives, considers, or recognizes’
women who are unable to leave their relationship” as a distinct, categori-
cal group.45 Thus, the Fifth Circuit upheld the BIA’s denial of Gonzales-
Veliz’s application for failure to state a cognizable particular social group
warranting a grant of asylum.46
35. Id. at 126.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 125-26. The constitutionality of nationwide injunctions has come under at-
tack in recent years. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet spoken
directly to the issue, Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch, in separate concurring opinions,
have urged the Court to take up the question of their legality. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (mem.); Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
38. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 228 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We cannot be hindered
from performing our duty by an injunction in another jurisdiction that is currently being
appealed and is predicated on a view of immigration law with which we disagree . . . .”).





44. Id. (quoting Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335 (A.G. 2018)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit was incorrect in applying the principles from Matter
of A-B- to Gonzales-Veliz’s case because doing so breaks from existing
BIA precedent and effectively creates a categorial ban on all asylum ap-
plications based on domestic violence, in violation of the APA and the
INA. In the present case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the holding in Matter
of A-R-C-G-, which recognized “married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship” as an accepted social group on the
grounds that the government in that case did not contest the issue of par-
ticular social group, thereby “short-circuiting” that analysis.47 The Matter
of A-R-C-G- court did, however, address the particular social group issue
extensively using existing case precedent recognizing similar groups, as
well as a full analysis of the proffered social group under existing asylum
law.48 Under that analysis, the proffered social group was cognizable be-
cause it was immutable, particular, and socially distinct.49 Under the INA,
the decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- should have been binding precedent
in “all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”50 Nevertheless,
the Attorney General, as well as the Fifth Circuit in the present case,
declined to follow the BIA decision as binding precedent, resulting in
substantial confusion for asylum seekers.51 The confusion is particularly
grave in cases like Gonzales-Veliz’s, where an asylum seeker relies on
precedential opinions in drafting her application only to have the law
change significantly while review of the application is pending.52
In addition to added confusion for asylum seekers, the Gonzales-Veliz
decision has the effect of precluding all cases based on domestic violence.
The Fifth Circuit concludes that “[b]ecause the Attorney General said
that ‘there may be exceptional circumstances when victims of private
criminal activity could meet these requirements,’” Matter of A-B- does
not create a categorial ban; however, the court’s analysis of the particular
social group issue in Gonzales-Veliz proves otherwise.53 Rather than ad-
dress the individualized facts of the case before it, the Fifth Circuit upheld
the BIA decision denying protection to the proffered social group merely
because it was “substantially similar” to the group rejected in Matter of
A-B-.54 The court failed to point out any dissimilarities between Gonza-
les-Veliz’s case and that of the asylum seeker in Matter of A-B-, and in
47. Id. at 229; Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
48. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392-95.
49. Id.
50. See Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 232 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2019)).
51. See id. at 236; Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (A.G. 2018). See generally
Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B-, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST.
CTR. (Jan. 2019), available at https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/
page/documents/2019-01/Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%201
.2019%20Update%20-%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8B6-M3PP] (detailing the conflict-
ing responses of circuit courts to the decision in Matter of A-B-).
52. See Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 226.
53. See id. at 232.
54. Id.
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doing so, failed to consider whether Gonzales-Veliz’s case might consti-
tute an “exceptional circumstance.”55 Courts employing a similar analysis
in future cases, merely tracking the language from Matter of A-B- rather
than reviewing the facts of each case on an individualized basis, will have
the obvious effect of a categorical ban on all cases based upon similar
social groups comprised of women, married or unmarried, who are suffer-
ing from unchecked domestic abuse in their home countries.
The categorical ban stemming from the decision in Gonzales-Veliz and
like cases runs contrary to congressional intent expressed in the INA. The
INA was amended in 1980 when Congress passed the Refugee Act de-
signed “to bring the United States’ domestic laws in line with” the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Protocol).56
Consistent with the Protocol, the INS requires “a case-specific factually
intensive analysis for each alien.”57 Thus, a categorical rule effectively
barring claims based on domestic abuse or other forms of private violence
is inconsistent with the plain language of the INA and congressional in-
tent to bring United States asylum law in line with the Protocol.58 Moreo-
ver, the Fifth Circuit’s categorical ban violates previous Department of
Homeland Security procedure under which an asylum officer is required
to “evaluate the entire scope of harm experienced by the applicant to
determine if he or she was persecuted, taking into account the individual
circumstances of each case.”59
Congressional intent is of paramount importance to federal court re-
view of agency decisions. The Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council established a deferential test for judicial review
of agency decisions, by which “legislative intent trumps executive imple-
mentation which in turn is given deference over judicial interpretation.”60
In the context of immigration proceedings, the Circuit Courts of Appeals
are the first non-executive branch decision makers to review asylum
claims, making adherence to the Chevron deference test of vital impor-
tance in preserving constitutional separation of powers.61 Where Con-
gress has directed an agency to act in a particular way, as Congress has
here through the INA, a reviewing court should require agency compli-
ance.62 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit in Gonzales-Veliz failed to take
account of the individualized review required by the INA, deferring in-
55. See id.
56. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 106 (D.D.C. 2018).
57. Id. at 126 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e) (2019)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 126 n.13.
60. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases,
71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 147 (2019).
61. Sweeney, supra note 60, at 171; see also Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching
in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. REV. 707, 707, 760–76 (2019) (analyzing the ways
in which executive overreaching in immigration adjudication threatens constitutional and
statutory rights).
62. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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stead to the Attorney General’s administrative opinion, in direct viola-
tion of Chevron.63
Even assuming that the Fifth Circuit’s Gonzales-Veliz decision does not
create an absolute ban on all similar social groups, it is clear that the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation of the particular social group requirement dispro-
portionately disadvantages victims of domestic violence, often women
and children, over other groups seeking asylum. The Fifth Circuit seems
to say that the proffered social group is both too broad, opening “broad
swaths of society” to victimization, and too narrow, reasoning that the
individualized nature of domestic abuse restricts the ability of Honduran
society to view its victims as a “distinct social group.”64 As a result, this
court has created a nearly impossible standard for victims of domestic
violence that fails to take account of the “unique and discrete issues not
present in other particular social group determinations.”65
Asylum claims based on domestic violence are unique in that they turn
on a specific culture of machismo and family violence that is poorly un-
derstood in American culture but has significant roots in Latin American
culture.66 The sheer number of instances of domestic abuse in Latin
American culture is evidence of machismo’s pervasiveness in those coun-
tries.67 The failure of American courts to recognize a culture of machismo
and family violence should not preclude a finding of a “distinct social
group” where victims of domestic violence are viewed as such in the vic-
tim’s home country.68 The court contradicts itself on this point when it
recognizes the large number of asylum cases that might result if it ac-
knowledges the widespread machismo culture in Honduras.69 However,
the court’s fear of too many victims should not be used to heighten the
standard of particularly for asylum seekers. Rather, it should highlight
63. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 234-35 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting then-Attor-
ney General Sessions in Matter of A-B-, the Fifth Circuit found that “nothing in the text of
the [INA] supports the suggestion that Congress intended membership in a particular so-
cial group to be some omnibus catch-all for solving every heart-rending situation.” (inter-
nal quotations omitted)).
64. See id. at 232.
65. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 394 (B.I.A. 2014).
66. Id. at 393; see also Nazario, supra note 5.
67. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 393; see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Rashida
Manjoo (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Wo-
men, Its Causes and Consequences, 5, U.N. Doc A/HRC/29/27/Add.1 (Mar. 31, 2015), avail-
able at https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/-/media/files/un%20women/vaw/
country%20report/america/honduras/honduras%20srvaw.pdf?vs=3000 [https://perma.cc/
CG8U-QFHC] (“Femicides [in Honduras] have increased alarmingly in recent years and
were highlighted as a major source of concern by all interlocutors. In 2012, 606 cases of
femicides were reported, which represents, on average, 51 women murdered per month.
According to preliminary statistics from official sources, 629 cases of femicide were regis-
tered in 2013. . . . It is reported that one in five cases of femicide occurs in the context of
domestic or intrafamiliar violence . . . .”).
68. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Evidence such as
country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory
laws and policies, historical animosities, and the like may establish that a group exists and
is perceived as ‘distinct’ or ‘other’ in a particular society.”).
69. See Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 2019).
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the need to return to individualized review of the specific facts of each
case before the court.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit’s rejection of “Honduran women unable to leave their
relationship” as a cognizable particular social group poses a significant
and arguably insurmountable barrier for women seeking asylum based on
domestic violence in their home countries. Rather than abide by congres-
sional intent expressed in the INA, the Fifth Circuit relies on an adminis-
trative decision that overturned years of BIA and circuit court precedent
mandating individualized review of asylum claims. Reliance on an admin-
istrative decision rather than express congressional direction violates the
Chevron deference test and creates a concern for executive overreaching.
This concern, already present in the area of asylum law, has been exas-
perated by an increase in the number of immigration cases decided by the
Attorney General under the Trump Administration.70 As a result, the
recognition of a particular social group meriting asylum has become
highly politicized, turning on the political preferences of the party in
power rather than the facts of each individual case.
In addition to breaking with BIA precedent and undermining the legis-
lative intent behind the INA, the decision fails to recognize the unique,
cultural issues that distinguish victims of domestic abuse from other
groups of asylum seekers. A culture of machismo and family violence in
Latin American countries has been recognized by reports of the United
Nations and should be similarly recognized by the United States judici-
ary. Accordingly, future courts addressing asylum claims by members of
particular social groups based on domestic violence should return to the
pre-Matter of A-B- framework and review cases on an individualized ba-
sis rather than abide by the Fifth Circuit’s unprecedented categorical ban.
70. Fatma Marouf, Immigration Challenges of the Past Decade and Future Reforms, 73
SMU L. REV. F. (forthcoming 2020) (“The asylum system was further eroded by former
Attorney General Sessions, who interfered in immigration adjudication in an unprece-
dented way, deciding as many immigration cases in one year as the attorneys general under
Bush and Obama did during eight-year periods.”).
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